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The introduction of aerial photography 
in the early twentieth century revolution-
ized not only the nature of warfare, as it 
became apparent in the First and Second 
World Wars, but also the representation 
and interpretation of the landscapes de-
picted in these photographs. In Palestine, 
a place that had long been represented by 
Orientalists and biblical scholars as the 
Judeo-Christian Holy Land, the advent 
of aerial photography with the Great War 
was an opportunity for the emergence 
of new frameworks for the exterior and 
distant interpretations of the landscape. 
From the Great War onwards, the major 
campaigns for the aerial documentation 
of the country’s landscape were a prod-
uct of either the war effort or sustaining 
British imperial aspirations in Palestine 
during the Mandate period. Although 
Orientalist descriptions of Palestine as 
the biblical Holy Land persisted, they 
were supplemented by a new warfare-in-
duced and technically and scientifically 
oriented imageries that accounted for the 
topographical, geographical, and built 
features of the landscape and its urban 
built environment.
With this in mind, and following 
Jeanne Haffner’s assertion that the 
view from above provided by aerial 
photographs brought with it a “new 
science of social space,”1 this study 
assesses some of the major applications 
of aerial power in Palestine, specifically 
aerial photography in the period between 
the Great War, when aerial photography 
in Palestine was first introduced, and the 
1936–39 Arab revolt, known as the Great 
Revolt, in the British Mandate period. It 
is divided into three main sections: the 
first, traces the early experimentations 
in aerial photography by both the 
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Bavarian-Ottoman and Australian-British sides of the Great War on the Palestine 
Front and some of the innovations in the sciences of cartography and geography that 
accompanied these experimentations; the second, locates British counterinsurgency 
operations during the Arab revolt in Palestine within the emergence of British imperial 
“air control” strategies after the Great War; and finally, examines the case of the 
destruction of the Old City of Jaffa in May–June 1936 through demolition operations 
that had been documented in a series of aerial photographs, showcasing an example 
of one of the most drastic imageries and, to some extent, consequences of the view 
from above.
The study primarily relies on archival research and collections at the Australian 
War Museum, Bavarian State Archives, British Library, and Israel State Archives, 
where many of the aerial photographs of Palestine’s urban landscape in the interwar 
period are located. It also relies on a series of publications from this period including, 
most notably, the works of Captain H. Hamshaw Thomas and Gustaf Dalman, who 
contributed a great deal to extending the usages of British and Bavarian wartime aerial 
photographs on the Palestine Front into purposes that included, but also exceeded, 
direct warfare operations. Especially important for the study of British activity during 
the Great Revolt in Palestine is a British government report titled “Military Lessons of 
the Arab Rebellion in Palestine” published in 1938, which has rarely been examined 
in academic scholarship on the revolt. Taking into consideration the colonial nature 
of most of these sources and archives, this article follows Ann Laura Stoler’s call 
for reading colonial archives “along the archival grain” to unpack and tap into the 
“colonial common sense” that appears in their aerial views and their shifting imageries 
and alterations of Palestine’s landscape.2
“Reality Seen from Above”
As it did elsewhere, the Great War brought to Palestine a plethora of advancements 
in warfare technology. Among the most significant of these technologies was the 
development of aerial imagery, combining the most recent innovations in airplane 
technology and photography. Although earlier iterations of aerial photography had 
appeared years before the war, it was in the Great War that their most systematic use to 
date materialized. In Palestine, from 1915 onwards, as the confrontations between the 
British-Australian and Ottoman-Bavarian forces began to intensify, and as the battles 
began to shift from Beersheba and Gaza in the south toward Palestine’s northern 
districts, Bavarian and Australian air squadrons began to play an instrumental role 
in the war effort. While this role also included direct aerial bombing, as with the 
heavy bombing campaign conducted by the No.1 Squadron of the Australian Flying 
Corps (AFC) on Ottoman forces along the Gaza-Beersheba line in March 1917 and 
other similar operations, the squadrons’ primary role was aerial reconnaissance for 
purposes of tracking enemy movements and the study of enemy camps to inform 
strategic planning.3
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By the end of the war, Bavarian and Australian airplanes had captured thousands 
of aerial photographs of Palestine, which are currently located in the Bavarian State 
Archives and the Australian War Museum (figure 1). These photographs were often 
overlapping and, at least for the Bavarian aerial photographs as evident from their 
geolocation, mainly concentrated along Palestine’s coastal and central regions, and 
the territories surrounding the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway line passing through Lydda 
and Ramla, which was one of the most strategic connections and sites of battle during 
the war. On some of the photographs, simple hand-drawn markings appear, indicating 
the locations of enemy camps and facilities. The more refined analysis of the aerial 
photograph’s content, however, was conducted by consulting military guidebooks, 
which enabled the approximation of enemy facilities and numbers in each encampment 
by including guidelines on enemy tents and their capacities, communication networks, 
and infrastructure networks.4 Hence, unlike previous wars where the enemy was only 
visible from the ground and in the battlefield, military operations and strategies during 
the Great War largely depended on the dual ability of exerting aerial power and taking 
aerial photographs, and the ability to interpret them and use them to approximate 
enemy size and predict their movements.
Figure 1. Mapping of locations of Bavarian aerial photographs in Palestine during WWI, 1916–18. 
(Mapping by author. Sources: data – Bavarian State Archives; base map – Google Earth, 2019.)
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In addition to their use for locating and assessing enemy troops, wartime aerial 
photography was also instrumental for devising new methods of cartographic 
production. The Palestine Front was among the earliest sites where these 
innovations appeared during the Great War. It did not take long for the British, 
following their advancement into central Palestine, to realize the significant 
shifts in the nature of the front. Unlike in Sinai and the Naqab, where they were 
faced with an open and largely uninhabited landscape, in central Palestine, the 
British had to face defense lines in the main towns and to adjust to new forms 
of trench-based warfare, built-up obstacles, and populated areas.5 The Palestine 
Exploration Fund (PEF) pre-war maps that the British had been using since the 
start of the war were inadequate for this kind of warfare and, as a result, they 
decided to carry out new cartographic initiatives which, due to the inaccessibility 
of the enemy-controlled regions they wanted to cover, had to rely heavily on 
aerial photography.
With the start of 1918, important innovations in cartographic practices based 
on aerial reconnaissance on the Palestine Front began to materialize. These 
innovations were led by Captain H. Hamshaw Thomas who utilized the supply 
of Bristol Fighters and five well-trained No.1 Squadron AFC pilots who risked 
flying at low altitudes, and devised new cartographic methods that catered to the 
hilly nature and dense urban habitats of Palestine’s central region. These methods 
involved new techniques both in taking overlapping photographs in air that 
aimed to minimize distortion, and in their compilation by the survey officer on 
the ground who aligned the aerial photographs with the reference of fixed points 
from previous maps (figure 2).6 More than three thousand square kilometers of 
the country were mapped using this new technique of map production in both 
1:20,000 and 1:40,000 scale series.7 Upon returning to his academic position at 
Downing College Cambridge after the war, Thomas published several academic 
papers on the “valuable lessons”8 in mapping learned on the Palestine Front, 
and suggested that the aerial photography and mapping techniques developed 
during the war, including on the Palestine Front, possessed “great potentialities 
as an instrument of scientific research,”9 particularly in the fields of geography, 
geology, botany, meteorology, and archaeology.
Around the same time Thomas was publishing his papers on the scientific 
uses of aerial photography based on British wartime activity on the Palestine 
Front in Britain, in Germany, Gustaf Dalman was preparing his book Hundert 
deutsche Fliegerbilder aus Palästina (One Hundred German Aerial Photographs 
from Palestine) which he published in 1925, based on the Bavarian wartime 
aerial photographic collection. Like Thomas, Dalman was also interested in the 
potentials of aerial photography beyond warfare and military operations. As 
someone with a profound interest in biblical archaeology and a long experience 
working in Palestine, however, Dalman was mostly interested in how wartime 
aerial photography could be used to geographically interpret Palestine’s landscape 
and urban development. This consideration was not entirely new for the Germans, 
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as some of the Bavarian 
aerial photographs 
captured during the 
Great War had been 
intended to serve the 
archaeological work 
of Theodor Wiegand 
in Sinai and southern 
Palestine.10 But Dalman 
also sought to move 
beyond archaeology. 





as overtly romanticized, 
biblified, and based on 
ideological distortions 
rather than historical 
and geographical 
study. Further, while 
he celebrates the works 
of early professional 
photographers in the 
region, like the Bonfils 
studio in Beirut, he 
is critical of their 
tendency to cater their 
photography to tourist and market demand for selective photography of specific 
“antiquities” and monumental sites rather than to the geographical and historical 
study of the landscape.11
Dalman saw in the aerial photographs of Bavarian Air Squadrons 300 and 304 on 
the Palestine Front an opportunity to move beyond these trends. To him, “only aerial 
photographs could replace the artificial assembled images [of the landscape], with reality 
seen from above, including the site alongside its surroundings, the exterior conditions 
of its existence, its traffic potentials, and the actual traffic routes until today.”12 For each 
Bavarian aerial photograph Dalman included in his book, he added a textual description 
of their visible topographical and geographical features, neighborhoods, road networks, 
and important buildings and sites. Unlike the biblical accounts of Palestine’s physical 
landscape common among his contemporary Orientalists and biblical scholars, or 
the photographic albums of the Holy Land sold to tourists, Dalman’s “scientific” 
descriptions acknowledged the features of urban modernity and urban change that the 
Figure 2. “Example of reconnaissance map worked up from a strip 
of overlapping photographs,” from Captain H. Hamshaw Thomas, 
“Geographical Reconnaissance by Aeroplane Photography, with 
Special Reference to the Work Done on the Palestine Front,” 
Geographical Journal 55, no. 5 (May 1920): 349–70, online at doi.
org/10.2307/1780446 (accessed 19 February 2020).
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country had been witnessing since at least the mid-nineteenth century. His descriptions 
of the main urban centers, including Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Haifa highlighted their 
physical transformations and their modern urban developments in the form of wide 
boulevards, railway networks, new ports, and extra muros neighborhoods. For each 
of these features, Dalman’s textual description included a numerical reference of its 
precise location on the photograph (figure 3).
Figure 3. Bavarian aerial photograph titled “Jaffa with Suburbs” and Dalman’s textual description of 
it, with numerical references to the location of key sites that appear on the photograph, including the 
Franciscan monastery, rail station, German colony, excursion to Jerusalem, Djemal Pasha Boulevard, and 
the southern street to Gaza among others. Gustaf Dalman, Hundert deutsche Fliegerbilder aus Palästina 
(Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1925), 76 and 77.
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In a sense, post-war publications like those authored by Dalman and Thomas 
indicate that the role of aerial photography both throughout and following the 
Great War had far exceeded its uses for military operations. One of the major 
effects of the wartime advent of aerial photography was in the shifts it influenced 
in representing and interpreting the urban landscape through new apparatuses of 
estimation and calculation. The Palestine Front was a primary site where some 
of these key shifts materialized, particularly with the British-led innovations in 
cartographic production using aerial photographs and the German utilizations of 
aerial photographs for archaeological surveys and for leading new “scientific” 
forms of interpreting physical geography and the urban built environment. In the 
two instances, the distance of aerial photographs enabled the objectification of the 
landscape below and its abstraction into a series of recognizable features which 
allowed for both its study and conquest. While highly significant in World War I 
and its immediate aftermath, these aerial objectifications and abstractions proved 
to have more radical usages in the Mandate period, as the British administration 
sought to tame the 1936–39 Great Revolt in Palestine.
“Combined Action”
For the British, the Great War was the start, not the end, for experiments in exerting 
aerial power in the Middle East. The most radical operations carried out by the British 
immediately after the war took place in Iraq, where they devised a new strategy of “air 
control” that was primarily intended to serve their imperial interests against the 1920 
Iraqi revolt. In her vital work on British counterrevolutionary activity in Iraq, Priya 
Satia shows that the explanation of why these new strategies of the Royal Air Force 
(RAF) were deemed by British experts as specifically suitable for Mesopotamia lie not 
only in financial reasons (as air power was more economical to operate than ground 
action), but also ideological motivations based on their conviction that “aircraft could 
rule the desert.”13 Satia explains:
These various experts deemed Mesopotamia peculiarly suitable for air 
operations, better than Europe, for aesthetic as much as topographical 
reasons: its presumed flatness promised many landing grounds, little 
cover to insurgents, and the possibility of “radiating” British power 
throughout the country from a handful of fittingly spartan bases, while 
the reality of its varied and protean topography, when acknowledged, 
was held to offer ideal training for the RAF, exposing it to every sort of 
terrain – mountains in Kurdistan, marshes in the south, riverain territory 
in between, and so forth. The difficulties of communication in Iraq made 
“the idea of using aircraft” “extremely tempting”; they could annihilate 
distance in hours.14
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The specificity of British “air control” operations to Mesopotamia meant that they 
were not translatable to other contexts of counterrevolutionary activity in densely 
populated urban environments in Britain, Ireland, or even for the purpose of suppressing 
the 1936–39 Arab revolt in Palestine.15 In his memoirs, Sir Arthur Harris, whose role 
as the RAF Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief during World War II acquired him the 
epithet “Bomber” Harris, and who briefly joined the RAF in their operations in Palestine 
during the Arab revolt following his service in Iraq, asserts that “it had never been 
proposed to exercise the same kind of air control over Palestine as over Irak [sic].”16
This, however, did not mean that aerial operations were not important for the British 
in the duration of the Arab revolt in Palestine. It meant rather that these operations had 
to operate differently, taking into consideration not only the hilly and densely populated 
nature of Palestine’s topography but also the nature of the revolt itself and British policy 
in Palestine at the time which, in the context of an established civil administration, 
had to balance between civil and military considerations. This latter consideration was 
an issue of major tension among the British military and civil forces in Palestine, as 
elucidated in an encounter between Harris and Bernard Montgomery (“Monty”), who 
was in charge of an infantry division during the Arab revolt, upon the latter’s arrival at 
the headquarters in Haifa. Recalling the encounter, Harris reports that Monty greeted 
him with “aircraft, aircraft, this is no job for aircraft. It’s a job for policemen.”17 To 
which Harris responded that “while [he] recognised that it was a job for policemen 
and not for aircraft, or for soldiers for that matter, the strength and determination of the 
rebels and the weakness of the police in arms and numbers were in themselves sufficient 
reason for using all the few military and air resources available.”18
For the duration of the revolt, especially with the organization of Arab armed 
bands, most British engagements operated in close cooperation between aircraft and 
ground troops, or as the British called it, “combined action.”19 The nature of British 
confrontations in Palestine during the Arab revolt was very distinct from what they had 
to deal with in World War I. Unlike the Ottoman-German troops, Arab armed bands 
in Palestine had no headquarters or key communications that could be targeted. The 
armed bands were always on the move and their activities depended on maintaining 
a high degree of elusiveness and unpredictability. For the British, the challenge was 
to concentrate their forces as quickly as possible and to strike the Arab bands before 
they were able to move. Aircraft were regarded as the “most suited weapon”20 to carry 
out such an operation. Nonetheless, the ability of aircraft to target the bands could 
not be achieved unless efficient organization and communication with the ground was 
successfully realized – two concerns that were at the heart of the strategies the British 
devised to tame the Arab revolt in Palestine. Among these strategies was dividing the 
country into four aircraft zones, where each zone is primarily the commitment of one 
squadron or detachment, and the installation of a number of RAF mobile wireless sets in 
trucks (known as “Rodex” vehicles) and distributed widely among army detachments. 
As soon as contact was made with the Rodex or the aircraft, conforming to the frequency 
of the aircraft zone, a call for air support to that zone would be made immediately by the 
central Air Striking Force (figure 4).21
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Figure 4. “Map illustrating aircraft zones issues with operation order no.8 dated 2 September 1936” in 
“Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936,” (1938), 104 IOR/L/MIL/17/16/16, British 
Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, 104.
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Through the aerial partitioning of Palestine and the system of air-ground 
communications that the British devised during the Great Revolt, they were able to 
carry out four forms of “combined action”: first, offensive action against armed bands, 
which was mostly a result of a call sent from the ground and answered by the Air 
Striking Force. An operation carried out on 28 July 1936 in Bab al-Wad which resulted 
in the killing of eleven Arabs, and an even greater action carried out on 24 September 
1936 in the Nablus hills which resulted in more than fifty Arab casualties, forty-one of 
which were caused by air action, and the dropping of thirty-three bombs, both illustrate 
the drastic nature of these actions22; second, aerial reconnaissance, which included 
reconnaissance to locate the enemy, ground reconnaissance, and reconnaissance to 
detect sabotage on main communication lines; third, the use of aircraft for the escort of 
military vehicle convoys and, less frequently, of trains carrying troops and equipment; 
and finally, the use of aircraft for intercommunication and supply of troops, which 
was necessary in only one or two cases throughout the duration of the revolt. For 
the British, these forms of “combined action” were especially important for carrying 
out their imperial counterinsurgency strategies during the Great Revolt, to the extent 
that they reported in 1938 that “there can be few operations on record in which co-
operation between aircraft and small military detachments were clearer and more 
effective than they were in Palestine.”23
“Operation Anchor”
A duality of construction and destruction characterized the physical effects of British 
counterinsurgency strategies during the Great Revolt on Palestine’s landscape. On 
the one hand, the British built enormous reinforced concrete police stations and posts 
in and around the major urban centers – later known as “Tegart Forts,” after Charles 
Tegart, a police officer who was transferred from India to Palestine in December 
1937 to serve as the Inspector General on security matters.24 These expensive and 
enormous concrete fortresses, which remarkably altered the country’s landscape, were 
instrumental in maintaining British control over urban centers and served as strategic 
frontiers that hindered the movement of the Arab rebels. At the same time, the British 
relied heavily on building demolitions as a form of punitive action, especially in the 
main urban centers, allegedly targeting buildings from which fire had been detected 
or buildings that had harbored rebels. Demolitions were, for the most part, a military 
assignment alone, though police advice was usually sought as to which houses were 
to be demolished. In some cases, sappers were summoned and the demolition was 
carried out immediately, while in other cases houses were marked for destruction, 
by daubing them with large circles of white paint, and demolition was withheld until 
“such time as further punishment became necessary.”25
The most drastic punitive operations of this nature were carried in a series of 
actions against the coastal Arab-majority city of Jaffa between 30 May and 30 June 
1936, which the Zionists later referred to as “Operation Anchor.” By the 1930s, Jaffa’s 
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urban expansion beyond the pre-nineteenth century walled city had exceeded the early 
signs of growth visible in its Bavarian aerial photograph from the Great War published 
in Gustaf Dalman’s book (figure 3). Nonetheless, in Operation Anchor, the British 
were specifically interested in the Old City of Jaffa, not the new neighborhoods of 
al-Manshiyya or al-‘Ajami that had been growing alongside the city’s northern and 
southern shores. The Old City’s danger for the British had to do with its population’s 
socioeconomic status, mostly comprised of boatmen whom they saw as “desperate 
men who had nothing to lose and much to gain by an appeal to force.”26 As they 
explain:
The Old City of Jaffa had long been a hotbed of lawlessness and revolt, 
and as such had usually set the example for rebellious activities all over 
the country. Its inhabitants had the reputation of being the toughest of 
all Arab elements, consisting mostly of boatmen of Greek descent who 
earned their living handling lighters in the Port of Jaffa, a difficult and 
dangerous occupation. Their natural dislike of authority had been greatly 
increased by the fact that they more than any other Arab community had 
suffered directly from the influx of Jews. They had seen Tel Aviv grow 
at their very doorstep into the biggest town in the country, and with its 
growth many of the commercial glories of Jaffa had departed as business 
tended more and more to centre in Tel Aviv.27
For the British, it was not only the Old City’s population that posed a problem, but 
also its architecture and layout:
Built upon a low hill flanked on one side by the sea, it completely 
dominated the Port and such buildings as the police station and barracks 
and the District Commissioner’s offices, which lay in the New City. 
Moreover, its houses formed a veritable rabbit warren through which 
dark and narrow streets turned and twisted into a maze in which the level 
of one street would often be the roof of the house in the one below and 
where few passages were so wide that they could not be spanned by the 
reach of a man’s arms. It represented in fact an exceedingly complicated 
trench system with vertical sides some thirty or forty feet high, which 
could readily be converted into a regular citadel.28
Hence, the densely built fabric of the Old City, difficult to navigate by military 
troops, and its topographical advantage over the New City, were also seen as a great 
drawback for the British force’s ability to subdue its population without an extreme 
and demolition-based operation.
The operation against the Old City was carried out in four consecutive phases. In 
the first phase, the British led retaliatory shootings against houses from which fire had 
been directed, using Vickers guns and rifle grenades, to which the Arab rebels in the 
Jerusalem Quarterly 81  [ 31 ]
Old City responded using a variety of weapons, including automatics. In the second 
phase, British forces rounded up all of the city’s available notable figures, shopkeepers, 
and householders in the affected area and forced them to work, along with municipal 
workers, in clearing up the outskirts of the Old City. In these two actions, the British 
drove the Arab rebels to their innermost hideouts in the very center of the Old City, 
which facilitated the implementation of the demolitions in the third and fourth phases. 
This included driving two roads through the Old City – from east to west in a straight 
line, and from north to south in a curved line – by means of demolitions.29
On 16 June, RAF airplanes flew over the Old City, dropping leaflets that called 
upon the inhabitants of the Old City to evacuate their homes by seven o’clock to 
enable demolitions to take place, which were described by the government as being 
“for the improvement of the Old City.”30 The leaflets were a major source of panic 
among the local residents, as an Arabic article published in al-Difa‘ newspaper the 
following day illustrates:
The residents of Jaffa woke up yesterday morning to the sound of a plane 
that was hovering right above the roofs of the city. Shortly after, it began 
dropping a large number of leaflets on the Old City […] The leaflet was 
printed in the government press in Jerusalem, and as soon as the residents 
read it they panicked, and the children tossed what the airplane had 
dropped in the Saraya square, located between the Government House 
and the Police Barracks.31
Local residents rejected the operation and considered “urban improvements” a 
false pretense for what was, to them, a clear instance of a politically motivated military 
operation. On the same day they received the leaflets, as al-Difa‘ also reported, the 
affected residents of the Old City decided to send letters of complaint to the High 
Commissioner and the Governor of the Southern District objecting to the nature of 
the operation and expressing its drastic consequences for the Old City’s population, 
most of whom were poor and unable to pay the costs of their temporary rent and 
resettlement.32 Despite this, the British government proceeded with their operation’s 
third and fourth phases as had been planned.
Unlike the extensive coverage of the events in Jaffa in al-Difa‘ and other local 
newspapers which remained close to the events on the ground and expressed the 
devastation of the Old City’s population, official British reporting on the events 
barely makes mention of the local inhabitants aside from their description as “rebel 
elements.” Rather, on the pages of the 1938 “Military Lessons” report as part of a 
section on “Punitive Action,” the brief description of British military strategy in Jaffa 
is supplemented by a series of six aerial photographs. These aerial photographs were 
taken by RAF Squadron No. 6 which, along with documenting the operations, was 
also tasked with conducting aerial reconnaissance of the area east of Jaffa to detect any 
movements that might suggest an attempt at “outside interference.”33 The photographs, 
taken in bird’s eye view, depict the city both before and after the demolition operations 
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(figure 5). In these 
photographs, points 
marked A, B, C, and D 
appear indicating the 
A-B line of demolitions 
for the third phase, 
and the C-D crescent 
for the fourth phase 
demolitions. Hence, in 
the aerial photographs, 
the action against the 
Old City appears as 
merely a technical 
operation – the simple 
mechanical drawing 
of a line between two 
points which, on the 
ground, translated into 
the strategic opening 
of “good wide roads 
through the old labyrinth 
of alleys.”34 In reality, 
though, as evident 
from a series of ground 
photographs taken 
after the demolitions, 
the operation violently 
obliterated the physical 
structure and fabric 
of the Old City and 
displaced its local 
inhabitants (figures 6 
and 7).35 The operation 
was so severe that the 
British contended that 
it “mark[ed] the end of 
organized resistance 
in the towns” and was 
the main cause behind 
the transfer of the main 
rebel activities to the 
hills from June 1936 
onwards.36
Figure 5. Two aerial photographs of Jaffa that appear in a 1938 British 
report, captioned “Demolitions completed on 18 June between points 
A and B,” and “The second stage of Demolitions – The circular road 
C-D completed on the 20/30. June” in “Military Lessons of the Arab 
Rebellion in Palestine 1936,” (1938) IOR/L/MIL/17/16/16, British 
Library, India Office Records and Private Papers.
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Figures 6 and 7. Two ground photographs of the Old City in Jaffa following the British demolition 
operations during the Great Revolt (1936–1939). Israel State Archives 12/4141/4.
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Conclusion
The developments of aerial power and aerial photography in the interwar 
period were a global phenomenon, not limited to the Middle East or Palestine. 
Nonetheless, in examining some of the principal aerial activities of the Germans 
and the British in Palestine during the first half of the twentieth century, it is evident 
that Palestine, both as a strategic frontline during the Great War and as a mandated 
territory in the decades that followed, was a site where major developments had 
taken place in the motivations behind and science of aerial photography. These 
developments, which were mainly experimental and born out of situations of 
crisis, were crucial in serving both German and British interests in direct warfare 
and military surveillance and, for the latter, for maintaining imperial control and 
crushing attempts at anticolonial insurgency in its colonial territories. With this in 
mind, it is not surprising that whereas German aerial photography in Palestine had 
ceased with the Great War, British aerial navigation in Palestine was exacerbated 
in the post-war period and was instrumental to the British administration’s taming 
of the 1936 Great Revolt. 
For the British, the nature of aerial power and uses shifted considerably between 
the Great War and the Arab revolt. This was not merely due to the two decades 
difference that separated the two events and the technological advancements in 
aerial warfare that had taken place in them, despite the importance of these shifts. 
Rather, it was mainly due to the different type of “warfare” in the two situations, 
and the starkly different nature of the “enemy.” In the Great War, the British 
were fighting against clear military targets with traceable lines of infrastructure, 
logistics, and communication. Hence, through aerial surveillance, the ability to 
study these elements and their size and position within the landscape was directly 
linked with the ability to target them, and gain warfare advantage. In the case of 
the Arab revolt, however, the main British target was the local population. While 
in urban settings, as in Jaffa, aerial power granted the British great advantage, this 
was not the case with the rural mountains. There, armed rebel bands were elusive 
and constantly on the move and, for the British, flying at close distance to the 
ground posed a high risk. It is under these conditions that the British had to devise 
a new strategy of ground-air intercommunication, or “combined action,” as the 
basis for their counterinsurgency activity. 
The applications of aerial photography in interwar Palestine were, undoubtedly, 
heavily motivated by military operations. Nonetheless, it would be inaccurate to suggest 
that aerial photography served military tasks alone. In this period, aerial photography 
was also central to the shifting imperial conceptions of Palestine’s landscape that 
departed from, albeit not entirely replaced, its traditional representation as the biblical 
Holy Land. Unlike nineteenth-century paintings and ground photographs of specific 
historical monuments in Palestine, aerial photographs depicted the vue d’ensemble of 
the urban landscape in the present. Thomas’s writings on the potential usages of aerial 
photography in cartography, and Dalman’s use of aerial photographs in the study of 
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